Chapter 12 · Simulation and Wargaming with AI Agents
Robert Axelrod
born 1943
Photograph: Ford School, retirement celebration for Robert Axelrod (12 October 2019), cropped video still, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Shown toned. File and licence
The problem on the desk
Which repeated-game rules sustain cooperation among self-interested players? Axelrod invited programs to play an iterated prisoner’s-dilemma tournament, then examined what the results did and did not imply beyond that particular field of opponents.1
A life in moments
- 1964
University of Chicago · Chicago
Completed a mathematics degree.2
- 1969
Yale University · New Haven
Completed a doctorate in political science.2
- 1974
University of Michigan · Ann Arbor
Joined the university.3
- 1980
University of Michigan · Ann Arbor
Reported the two computer tournaments.4
- 1984
Published The Evolution of Cooperation.5
- 2012
University of Michigan · Ann Arbor
Published a retrospective examining origins, noise and the collaboration with Hamilton.6
- 2014
Received the National Medal of Science.2
Every line rests on a dated source (numbered below) unless it carries a mark: R for an inference, S for a story as told.
In their own words
Of course, there is no one “best” strategy for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
A story
The problem of mistakes
In retrospect, Axelrod stressed how misperceived or misimplemented moves can trigger retaliation between reciprocal players. He discussed generous and contrite variants as responses to different kinds of noise.7
Around Axelrod
- co-author William D. Hamilton Axelrod and Hamilton combined game-theoretic and evolutionary perspectives in their 1981 paper.9
Recorded as advisor Hayward Rose Alker Recorded as students Bear Braumoeller, Lars-Erik Cederman, Dan Reiter Mathematics Genealogy Project record
The genealogy lists only what the database records; a missing name is not a missing teacher.
The card in the book
Political scientist at the University of Michigan since 1974, with a doctorate from Yale (1969). He ran two computer tournaments of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the first a round robin among the submitted decision rules and a random rule, the second with 62 entries, and reported them in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1980; an evolutionary analysis with the biologist William Hamilton followed in 1981 and the book The Evolution of Cooperation in 1984. Both rounds were won by TIT FOR TAT, the rule that cooperates on the first move and then repeats the other player's previous move.
Main works “Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma” and “More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma” (Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, 1980); “The evolution of cooperation”, with W. D. Hamilton (Science 211, 1981); The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
To read further
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod (2012) · first-person research retrospective
Sources (9)
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, 2012; §1 and footnote 2
- Robert Axelrod: professional homepage, Robert Axelrod; University of Michigan; Professional biography and selected publications
- Robert Axelrod to receive National Medal of Science, University of Michigan, Ford School, 2014; 3 October 2014; appointment since 1974 and award announcement
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, 2012; §1; references to the two 1980 articles
- Robert Axelrod: professional homepage, Robert Axelrod; University of Michigan; Selected publications
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, 2012; Journal issue date; online publication was in 2011
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, 2012; §2
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, 2012; p. 22, footnote 2
- Launching The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, 2012; §3
The facts on this page were gathered for the site from the sources listed, each checked against its locator; the book's card is reproduced unchanged.